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Abstract: Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are getting increasingly complex and interconnected. 
Consequently, their inherent safety risks and security risks are so intertwined that the conventional 
analysis approaches which address them separately may be rendered inadequate. STPA (Systems-
Theoretic Process Analysis) is a top-down hazard analysis technique that has been incorporated 
into several recently proposed integrated Safety and Security (S&S) analysis methods. This paper 
presents a novel methodology that leverages not only STPA, but also custom matrices to ensure 
a more comprehensive S&S analysis. The proposed methodology is demonstrated using a case 
study of particular commercial cloud-based monitoring and control system for residential energy 
storage systems. 
Keywords: cyber-physical system; hazard analysis; safety analysis; security analysis; STPA; STAMP; 
FMEA; STRIDE; matrix 
1. Introduction 
Thanks to the advances in ICT (Information and Communications Technology), critical 
infrastructure systems such as power grids, public transportation and water distribution 
networks are getting increasingly connected and sophisticated. Desire for better real-
time monitoring and control, additional functionality, greater effciency, etc., is also a 
driving factor. Such modern system or even systems of systems, whose physical processes 
are remotely controllable/accessible over any telecommunication means (e.g., computer 
networks and the Internet), are also known as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). 
CPSs, like their traditional counterparts, have inherent safety risks that must be 
identifed and suffciently addressed. However, assessing the safety of CPS can be com-
paratively challenging and complicated due to the intertwining nature of CPS’ physical 
processes and cyber elements. Most of the popular hazard/safety analysis techniques such 
as FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) [1] and FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) were 
initially created for analysing systems whose reliance on software and network connec-
tivity is minimal. Though progressively improved over the years, these techniques seem 
insuffcient for analysing today’s complex software-intensive systems (including CPSs). 
In CPSs, the faults/failures are no longer primarily caused by hardware reliability issues 
but hazardous interactions between system components. Hazardous interactions may 
occur accidentally because of poor/inadequate system design, or perhaps more likely be 
triggered by security attacks. Security attacks can result in signifcant physical damage to 
CPSs (e.g., German steel mill [2] and Iranian nuclear facilities [3]), which in turn jeopardize 
the overall safety. 
Realizing the pressing need for holistic approaches to addressing Safety and Security 
(S&S) of CPSs, various integrated S&S analysis methods have been recently proposed in the 
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literature [4,5]. Among them are systems theory-based approaches that adopt/extend STPA 
(System Theoretic Process Analysis). STPA is a hazard analysis technique that has been 
applied in various domains such as aerospace [6], automobile [7], and nuclear facilities [8]. 
Some studies have shown that STPA can identify not only the loss scenarios found by 
other traditional safety analysis techniques (e.g., FTA and FMEA), but also many that are 
irrelevant to component failures; meanwhile, it consumes less resources including time. 
Another notable advantage of adopting STPA is that it can be applied in early phases of the 
system development lifecycle. Analysis can commence as soon as the high-level goals of 
the system are defned, and can be further elaborated as the system design specifcation 
matures progressively. 
Nevertheless, STPA has some limitations that may make it diffcult to apply especially 
when analysing the security of a system. Therefore, some extended versions of STPA have 
been proposed recently. However, even from these existing STPA-based analysis methods, 
we note two major gaps as follows: (1) little or no explicit guidance on deriving Security 
requirements; and (2) lack of discussion on managing the relationships (especially conficts) 
between the derived Safety and Security requirements. To address these gaps, this paper 
proposes a novel S&S analysis method that utilizes custom matrices. 
Graphical and tabular representations of data/information are typically used to facili-
tate analysis; and matrices are no exception. The custom matrices presented in this paper 
are inspired by our earlier works—e.g., [9,10]—where unique combination of matrices were 
utilized in managing the S&S of automated vehicles (a kind of CPS). Nonetheless, these 
combinations of matrices and even other existing ones are generally different in terms of 
(1) quantity of matrices, (2) sequence/arrangement of matrices, and (3) semantics. Obvi-
ously, there’s no one-size-fts-all combination of matrices. Even when analysing the same 
system different analysts may employ different combinations of matrices, depending on 
their interests, ways of thinking, expertise level, etc. A particular combination of matrices 
is considered effective (though not perfect) as long as it eases particular problem(s) faced 
by the analysts—which, in the context of this paper, shall be overseeing the correlations 
between Safety and Security of the analysed system. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews STPA and 
related analysis approaches. Section 3 gives a detailed description of the proposed S&S 
analysis methodology. Section 4 briefy illustrates how the proposed methodology is 
applied to analyse a realistic CPS in power domain. Section 5 concludes the paper and 
outlines the future work. 
2. Literature Review 
Various integrated safety and/or security analysis approaches have been proposed in 
the literature, focusing on different phases of the system life-cycle. Regardless, they can be 
classifed into three categories based on the discussion in [4,5,11]: 
• Security-informed Safety approaches that leverage on security-related information 
(e.g., intentional causes) for enhancing safety analysis; 
• Safety-informed Security approaches that utilize safety-related information (e.g., com-
ponent failures) for enhancing security analysis; 
• Combined S&S approaches that analyse Safety and Security either in series or par-
allel and their respective artefacts are mutually integrated into subsequent analysis 
steps/phases/stages. 
STPA is an emerging hazard analysis technique that has been integrated into many 
S&S analysis approaches proposed in recent years. The S&S analysis methodology pro-
posed in this paper is also built on STPA. Therefore, this section reviews some existing 
approaches that adopt or extend STPA, and highlights their limitations which the proposed 
methodology intends to address. 
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2.1. System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) 
STPA [12], proposed by Leveson in 2011, is a hazard analysis technique that has 
gained popularity among researchers and practitioners in engineering the safety of com-
plex systems in various domains. It is developed based on STAMP (Systems-Theoretic 
Accidents Model and Process)—a model that considers the safety of a complex system as 
a control problem rather than a component failure or reliability issue. It aims to identify 
hazardous control scenarios that might lead to unwanted losses, and then accordingly 
defne the constraints/requirements to avoid/mitigate such scenarios. Inadequate controls 
can arise because of human error, software error, inappropriate interaction between system 
components, etc. Detailed reasons why traditional safety engineering approaches are unft 
for addressing the safety of complex systems can be found in [12]. However, STPA has not 
explicitly considered the security aspects of the system. 
Basically, the fow of STPA can be summarized as follows: (1) Identify the high-level 
(systemic) accidents/losses that are to be prevented; (2) Identify the potential hazards that 
would lead to the identifed accidents/losses; (3) Defne the safety constraints with regards 
to identifed hazards; (4) Draw the control structure diagram showing the components 
of the system of interest as well as their interfaces and boundaries; (5) Identify all the 
control actions involved in the control structure diagram; (6) Identify the hazards that may 
arise when these control actions are inadequate—i.e., not provided, incorrectly provided, 
untimely provided, and stopped/applied too soon/long; (7) Translate the hazardous 
control actions into safety constraints; (8) Identify how the hazardous control actions 
would occur based on the causal factors shown in Figure 1; and (9) Translate the identifed 
causal scenarios into safety constraints. 
Control input or external 
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Figure 1. STPA’s generic control loop diagram annotated with relevant causal factors resulting in hazardous/insecure 
control actions [12–14]; note that the underlined texts are security related guide-words proposed by Schmittner et al. [15] to 
help deducing intentional/malicious scenarios. 
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2.2. STPA-Sec (STPA for Security) 
Most of the conventional security assessment approaches have adopted tactics mod-
els [13,14]. In such models, the emphasis is placed on identifying the chains of events 
in which the particular threats of interest precipitate in order to reach their (malicious) 
goals, and then devising the tactics to break those chains. Such a threat-based approach 
works best when the security analysts possess a good understanding of the system assets 
as well as attackers/adversaries’ capabilities, motives, etc. It enables the security analysts 
to pin-point the entry points (vulnerabilities of logical/physical system components) that 
are likely to be exploited by the attackers/adversaries, and thereafter suggest the most 
cost-effective ways to prevent attacks, hence losses. Such approach however, as argued 
in [13], seems lacking in securing today’s diverse, interconnected, software-intensive sys-
tems. Security analysts adopting it might conduct the assessment without having the 
right set of priorities that aligns well with the higher-level goals or intended functions of 
the system; for instance, while disabling the access to particular data might be deemed 
imperative by the security team, it bothers those (e.g., operation team) who need the access 
to perform certain higher-level system functions. 
In view of the aforesaid limitations of threat-based (bottom-up) approaches, Young 
and Leveson introduced a top-down security analysis method, namely STPA-Sec [13,14]. 
The process of STPA-Sec is largely identical to that of STPA. The major difference between 
STPA-Sec and STPA is that the former aims to prevent the system from getting into vul-
nerable states while the latter—hazardous states. However, STPA-Sec utilizes the same 
control loop diagram (depicted in Figure 1) of STPA, which does not explicitly show which 
causal factors are relevant to security; this may not be an issue to the experienced analysts 
though. Nevertheless, a control loop diagram containing more explicit and security-related 
information (including terminologies) is more likely to facilitate identifcation of haz-
ardous/vulnerable scenarios, as advocated in [15] where the said diagram enhanced with 
some relevant security guide-words was applied in analysing a real-world complex and 
connected automotive system. 
2.3. STPA-SafeSec 
There is a growing recognition that Safety and Security should be considered holisti-
cally when analysing/designing CPSs such as industrial control systems [16], automated 
vehicles [17–19], and intelligent transport systems [20–22]. 
STPA analyses the system mainly from Safety perspective while STPA-Sec—Security 
perspective. As an effort to treat safety and security equally, Friedberg et al. combines 
STPA and STPA-Sec into a concise approach called STPA-SafeSec [23]. To complement 
the STPA’s generic control loop diagram (shown in Figure 1), STPA-SafeSec introduces a 
generic component layer diagram encompassing the physical components (e.g., network 
device and connection) that typically exist in any control loop. In addition, it suggests the 
likelihoods of certain security threats violating availability/integrity can be exploited on 
particular system components; these threats serve as additional causal factors, besides those 
included in Figure 1, that the analyst should consider in identifying the S&S constraints. 
The constraints are then mapped to the system components using a graph, as illustrated in 
Figure 2, to highlight which constraints may be violated at each component. The greater 
the number/criticality of constraints potentially violated at a component, the greater the 
urgency to perform in-depth security analysis on that component. By leveraging on the 
graph and the component layer diagram, the analysts might see which S&S constraints are 
in fact more crucial for addressing the hazards, thereby determining the most cost-effective 
set of constraints/solutions. 
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Figure 2. An example of graphical representation that shows which safety or security constraints 
could potentially be violated at every component of the system. 
However, it is unclear how STPA-SafeSec defnes those Availability/Integrity threats 
and even the likelihoods of exploiting them. Obviously, it does not address Confdentiality— 
one of the three key Security properties besides Availability and Integrity. Please note that, 
in contrast with STPA-SafeSec, the proposed S&S analysis methodology (see Section 3) 
employs STRIDE model [24] and thus covers all three key Security properties—i.e., Conf-
dentiality, Integrity, and Availability. 
Furthermore, the inter-dependency between S&S constraints (aka requirements), 
which STPA-SafeSec considers, seems not falling into any of these three categories (dis-
cussed in [25,26]), namely Conditional Dependency, Confict, and Reinforcement. There is 
a consensus that the conficts between requirements should be identifed and resolved as 
early as possible especially during system development [27–32]. Identifying or resolving 
conficts between requirements can be challenging [33]. There seems to be a paucity of liter-
ature on how to identify conficts between Safety and Security; Pereira et al. [32] suggest 
that both safety analysts and security analysts should work together; Kriaa et al. [26] utilize 
a modeling formalism called BDMP (Boolean logic Driven Markov Processes). The latter 
the conficts get spotted, the greater the cost/effort to resolve them [33]. 
2.4. SAFE (Systematic Analysis of Faults and Errors) 
Inspired by STPA, Procter et al. initiates SAFE [34] with steps identical to those 
of STPA—i.e., defning high-level losses, followed by identifying potential hazards and 
modelling the system’s control structure. From the control structure model, instead of 
examining any control actions like STPA does, SAFE immediately looks into the system 
component that is nearest to the controlled process. On this component there are basically 
fve steps performed: (i) defne the process model of the component (ii) defne the erroneous 
inputs that could cause the component to produce hazardous output; (iii) document how 
erroneous inputs could lead to hazardous outputs as well as how to prevent/mitigate 
them; (iv) identify the component’s internal faults based on a standardized set of fault 
classes; (v) document how internal faults could lead to hazardous outputs as well as how to 
detect/prevent them at design or run-time. These fve steps are then recursively performed 
on every component that precedes the current component, until all system components 
have been covered. 
As for addressing Safety and Security in SAFE, in step (iii) Procter et al. examines how 
the receiving component is negatively affected by seven categories of erroneous inputs 
derived from a particular security adversary model [35] established in 1983. These seven 
categories of erroneous inputs basically summarize all possible ways that the inputs can be 
erroneous regardless of whether they arise due to accidental faults or intentional attacks. 
Simply put, SAFE disregards the causes or sources of erroneous inputs; it claims that 
both Safety and Security concerns can be addressed merely by focusing on the effects 
of a minimal set of erroneous inputs on every component of the system and not on the 
underlying causes of erroneous inputs. In Procter’s earlier work [36], the erroneous inputs 
considered in SAFE were derived from a taxonomy proposed by Avizienis et al. [37] in 2004. 
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It is undeniable that both accidental faults (e.g., broken input transmission cable) and 
intentional attacks (e.g., injection by Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)) would result in the same 
erroneous inputs (e.g., corrupted message) to the receiving components. However, identi-
fying potential causes/sources of erroneous inputs is likely to result in more effectively 
planned measures; note that this is a common advantage of bottom-up hazard/threat 
analysis techniques. For instance, if input injection by MITM is deemed impossible in 
light of the component’s realistic environment, then perhaps it would be more feasible 
or cost-effective to just ensure the input transmission cable’s reliability than requiring 
the legacy component to flter out injected messages. Besides, while SAFE acknowledges 
that the system design has to be updated once the measures are introduced to fulfl the 
derived requirements, it seems to not mention whether/how the resultant changes should 
be analysed. 
In contrast with SAFE, the proposed S&S analysis methodology—as discussed later in 
Section 4—explicitly considers both accidental/natural factors and intentional/malicious 
causes (of erroneous inputs) in order to determine a more practical and cost-effective set 
of S&S requirements (and thus S&S measures); besides, any resultant changes in system 
design shall be refected by the proposed matrices to help the analyst check the overall 
equilibrium among various aspects of the analysed system. 
2.5. Other Works That Employ STPA 
In [15], STPA-Sec [13] is extended by introducing a standardized set of safety and 
security terminologies and adding some security elements into its generic control loop 
diagram; such extended STPA-Sec is demonstrated via analysing a vehicular battery man-
agement system [15]; besides, limitations of the original STPA-Sec with respect to relevant 
automotive standards (e.g., ISO26262 and SAEJ3061) are discussed. In [38], the extended 
STPA-Sec proposed in [15] is adopted to identify the hazardous scenarios which are then 
inputted to a component-centric approach called FMVEA (Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities, 
and Effect Analysis) [39] to evaluate the likelihood and severity of the Safety and Security 
risks of a realistic train braking system. In [32], STPA and NIST SP 800-30 [40] are employed 
to identify the Safety constraints and Security constraints, respectively; the security team 
performing NIST SP 800-30 also works with the safety team in certain steps of STPA to 
identify the potential causal factors and scenarios for identifying the Safety constraints; 
then, Safety team and Security team jointly process the two individual sets of constraints to 
identify the potential conficts or pairwise reinforcements between them, and subsequently 
defne the appropriate security measures and safety recommendations; such methodology 
is illustrated via analysing a revolving door system. In [41], STPA is employed to identify 
how and when hazardous scenarios may emerge due to generic causes and intentional 
causes like jamming and tampering; the identifed hazardous scenarios are then trans-
lated into critical requirements on a formal model processed via a specifc tool to formally 
verify whether the constraints suffciently mitigate the identifed hazardous behaviours; 
such methodology is demonstrated via analysing a hydroponics facility. In [10], safety 
requirements and security requirements are derived from STPA and attack trees, respec-
tively; the derived requirements along with other relevant information are then integrated 
into a Six-Step Model [42] for achieving integration and alignment safety and security of 
automated vehicle. 
3. Proposed S&S Analysis Methodology 
The proposed analysis method basically consists of 7 steps, as summarized in Figure 3, 
which may be iterative until the applicable safety and security requirements are reasonably 
satisfed. Note that the proposed methodology’s fow (from Step 1 to Step 6) is similar to 
those of STPA [12] and STPA-Sec [13]; all seven steps of the proposed methodology are 
described in the following. 
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as follows: a) not provided; b) 
incorrectly provided; c) 
untimely provided; and d) 
stopped too soon or applied 
too long
Identify the components’ behaviors 
due to inappropriate signals (ISs)
Identify the signals output and 
received by components
Identify the potential causes (PCs) of ISs
Derive the requirements from 
PCs and STRIDE analysis 
List of signals (S)




Identify potential hazards 
and vulnerabilities
List of requirements (R)

















List of measures (M)







Figure 3. Overview of the proposed Safety and Security (S&S) analysis method. The methodology is basically comprised 
of 7 steps, which may be iterated until the derived set of S&S requirements is deemed reasonably satisfed. The 8-Matrix 
Diagram (8MD), constructed and constantly updated using analysis artefacts, is utilized to oversee correlations between 
Safety and Security of the analysed system. 
The analysis (Step 1) starts with defnition of the system. It should describe the inter-
actions between the system and its environment (e.g., stakeholders and weather) as well 
as between hardware/software components of the system. This initial step may involve 
materials and diagrams that describe the system from various perspectives—for example, 
control structure/loop (as in STPA), hardware architecture, and data fow. The gathered 
information is then utilized in Step 2 to deduce the relevant hazards/vulnerabilities that 
may result in undesired accidents or loss events. For example, an ill-trained maintenance 
worker overlooking particular ageing machine parts, which eventually leads to machine 
failure and hence service interruption. 
Step 3 of the proposed method aims to identify all necessary and unnecessary signals 
that may exist within the system. Necessary signals (e.g., commands, data, feedback, 
and power) are those transmitted among the system components to ensure intended 
functionality of the system. Unnecessary signals are usually byproducts of their emitters, 
or those not benefcial to the components who receive them intentionally or unintentionally. 
For instance, loud noises or high heat output by machines can be unnecessary (and thus 
hazardous) signals to nearby users or fammable substances; besides, a router’s Wi-Fi 
signal, which is needed for enabling authorized personnel to remotely access the networked 
devices, also exposes the router to hacking if it can be captured by attacker using dedicated 
tools. Therefore, any unnecessary signals identifed ought to be removed immediately 
if possible. 
For each necessary signal, Step 4 identifes the adverse impact that may arise should 
the signal become inappropriate in the following ways: (1) the signal is not provided; 
(2) the signal provided is wrong; (3) the signal is untimely provided; and (4) the signal 
is stopped/applied too soon/long. These four types of inappropriate signal are adapted 
from four types of unsafe control action mentioned in STPA; note that not all four ways of 
inappropriate signal (or unsafe control action) are always applicable. The adverse impact 
is deduced considering how the components (receiving inappropriate signals) would react 
internally as well as its resultant actions towards all of its dependent components; as 
this probably looks into the behaviours/algorithms of the involved components, addi-
tional or more specifc hazards/vulnerabilities (e.g., hardware limitations and software 
bugs) may be identifed. Moreover, any pre-identifed unnecessary yet non-removable 
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signals are also considered as inappropriate signals. This step ultimately produces a list of 
inappropriate signals. 
Step 5 identifes the potential causes (PCs) of identifed inappropriate signals, by utiliz-
ing the template illustrated in Figure 4. The template is manifested as a tree that summarizes 
the generic reasons behind a malfunctioning component. Component Malfunction (CM) 
denotes that the component is unable to produce the correct/desired output; it can poten-
tially be due to any of three main factors, namely Algorithm Failure (AF), Input Failure 
(IF), and Damage/Disruption (DD). AF denotes that the component’s algorithm is inad-
equate; IF—the input required by the component is unavailable or inadequate; DD—the 
component is damaged or disrupted. Certainly, not all nodes of the tree are applicable to 
every component of the system; each node may be decomposed into low-level nodes to 
further explain the causal factor; the analysts are required to apply only the relevant ones 
during elicitation of PCs. It is worth noting that the template is designed considering the 
information shown in Figure 1; any causal factors (shown in Figure 1) can be mapped to 
the proposed template; for example, “feedback delays”, “inadequate or missing feedback”, 
“inappropriate, ineffective or missing control actions” are basically input failures to their 
receivers; besides, “inadequate operation”, “inadequate control algorithm”, and “process 
model tampered” can be considered as algorithm failures; furthermore, any elements 
including actuators may potentially be tampered, which is clearly not included in STPA’s 
control loop diagram (c.f. Figure 1). Therefore, the template is deemed useful as it provides 
a systematic means of stating the PCs using consistent and concise words. Stating the 
PCs succinctly is important to minimize confusions, as a large quantity of PCs are usually 
identifed during the analysis and processing them in subsequent analysis stages can be 
time-consuming. Nevertheless, the template could be tailored for specifc applications by 
comprising more precise and relevant causes/nodes. 




Damage or Disruption (DD)
Legitimate input provider malfunctions, 
thereby producing no or incorrect signal
Legitimate input provider produces the correct 
signal; the signal however is then lost/corrupted 
due to malfunctioned transmission medium
The component receives inappropriate










Figure 4. A template, manifested as a tree, that shows the three generic factors of Component Malfunction (CM), namely 
Algorithm Failure (AF), Input Failure (IF), and Damage/Disruption (DD). 
Step 6 is intended to derive the S&S requirements from identifed PCs and STRIDE 
analysis. STRIDE is among the most popular threat-modelling methods [24,43]; it evaluates 
a system against six main categories of threats, namely, Spoofng, Tampering, Repudiation, 
Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of privilege. Specifcally, we 
employ MTMT (Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool) to perform STRIDE analysis. Based on 
the Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) which we build corresponding to the analysed system, 
MTMT would automatically output a list of potential security threats. By addressing the 
MTMT-identifed security threats, it is reasonable to assume that CIA (Confdentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability) of analysed system is adequately ensured. The MTMT output 
can be regarded as security requirements which could also be used to refne the pre-
identifed PCs. Put crudely, Spoofng or Tampering may correspond to AF, IF, or DD; 
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Denial of service—IF or DD; and Elevation of privilege—AF or DD. All the identifed PCs 
(called causal scenarios in STPA) are then translated into requirements (called constraints 
in STPA), simply by negating them. For instance, a PC stating “Adam provides wrong 
command to Bob because Adam receives incorrect data from Collin” can be translated into 
a requirement stating “Adam must receive correct data from Collin so that Adam provides 
correct command to Bob”. 
Step 7 aims to ensure that the derived set of S&S requirements has been adequately 
fulflled. The process is typically lengthy because the analyst team is required to metic-
ulously check a large set of requirements for the following reasons: (1) refning vague 
requirements with more precise details and keywords (e.g., components and signals); 
(2) removing repetitive, redundant, or obsolete requirements; (3) identifying potential 
conficts between requirements; (4) planning and deciding the measures for satisfying the 
requirements based on criteria like cost incurred and measures’ effectiveness. Making 
decisions (especially prioritizing which requirements or measures) can be challenging 
without having an accurate understanding of the impact which a decision may bring. This 
can be facilitated by leveraging on a graphical tool called 8-Matrix Diagram (8MD) that 
enables the analyst team to holistically view the essences of analysis artefacts. As illus-
trated in Figure 3, 8MD is formed by 8 matrices (described in Table 1) built of artefacts 
obtained throughout the analysis process. In each matrix, as described in Table 1, particular 
symbols may be placed at intersections of row headers and column headers to denote their 
relationships. An example of 8MD is given in Section 4 to demonstrate the application of 
the proposed methodology for a realistic CPS in power domain. 
Table 1. Description of eight matrices that form 8-Matrix Diagram (8MD). 
Matrices Rows Columns Possible Symbols and Their Meanings 
HH Hazards Hazards X—The (row) hazard arises due to the (column) hazard. 
CH Components Hazards X—The component is the fnal trigger of the hazard; 
CC Components Components <—The (row) component receives signal from the (column) component; 
>—The (row) component provides signal to the (column) component. 
P—The component is the legitimate provider of the signal; 
SC Signals Components R—The component is the intended receiver of the signal; 
T—The component is the transmission medium of the signal. 
RC Requirements Components X—The requirement may be violated if the component malfunctions. 
RR Requirements Requirements X—The (row) requirement conficts the (column) requirement. 
MC Measures Components X—The component is required for implementing the measure. 
MR Measures Requirements O—The measure contributes to satisfying the requirement; X—The measure may violate the requirement. 
The analysis could just terminate at the end of Step 7, if the derived set of S&S 
requirements is considered reasonably satisfed. Or, with all the artefacts (including 8MD) 
established thus far, it can be iterated from Step 1. Such iteration would be necessary, 
if there are changes in the system architecture because of addition/removal/modifcation 
of particular system elements. The changes also need to be analysed to make sure they 
do not introduce unacceptable risks. At each iteration the analysis artefacts are revised 
accordingly. It is worth noting that the scales, metrics, criteria, or benchmarks used for 
judging if the derived set of S&S requirements is reasonably satisfed are determined 
on a case-by-case basis, which typically includes stakeholder expectations, applicable 
national/international standards, local rules and regulations. 
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4. Case Study 
4.1. System Defnition 
The Cyber-Physical System (CPS) in this case study is a cloud-based monitoring and 
control system for large residential lithium-ion (Li-on) energy storage systems. An overview 
of the said CPS is shown in Figure 5 to illustrate the interactions among the system hard-
ware components; note that it is not intended to be exhaustive but showing some necessary 
signals (including commands, measurements, actions, etc.) transmitted between compo-
nents. Please also note that technology-specifc details are abstracted owing to commercial 
sensitivity; though not explicitly shown in Figure 5, various telecommunication means (e.g., 
cellular networks, computer networks, and the Internet) are in fact involved to enable seam-
less signal exchange among a plethora of the system components and sub-components. 
In the following, the term system is used to denote the CPS of this case study. In the 
system, Lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries are used to store the energy. Such large-scale energy 
storage, as compared to small and medium-size applications like consumer electronics, is 
more likely to be exposed to extreme conditions. Li-on batteries can fail owing to cell’s 
chemical imbalance, internal short-circuit, or external causes such as exposure to high 
heat, mechanical damages, and electrical abuse conditions. Failure of Li-on batteries is 
probably among the most undesired risks, as it can lead to fre or explosion, and hence 
signifcant losses. A good discussion on potential hazards related to Li-on battery systems 
as well as their mitigation may be found in [44]. Please note that the analysis is carried 
out on a commercial system and not a research grade equipment; therefore, the analysis is 
























































Figure 5. A simplifed architecture of the cloud-based monitoring and control system for residential 
Li-on battery storage systems. 
As shown in Figure 5, there are four major components in the system, namely EMU 
(Energy Monitoring Unit), PCS (Power Conversion System), BMS (Battery Management 
System), and EMS (Energy Management System). The EMU communicates with PCS/BMS 
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via Modbus RTU using serial RS-485 cables. The EMU is the master while PCS and BMS are 
the slaves. Periodically, EMU uploads to EMS the data it requests from both PCS and BMS. 
On certain occasions, EMU may receive operational commands (e.g., shutdown or reboot 
EMU) from EMS. The PCS serves as an interface between the battery and the grid/load, 
and determines the rate of charging/discharging. It converts AC power into DC power 
(or vice versa) in the event of battery charging (or discharging).Furthermore, it monitors 
local measurements from current and voltage transformers, and contains some features to 
protect the system from over-current, phase imbalance, etc. Periodically, PCS reports its 
status and applies the required confguration, as requested by EMU. The BMS measures 
the battery’s conditions (e.g., cell voltage, cell temperature, and current). Based on the 
measured values, it estimates the battery’s SOC (State of Charge) and SOH (State of Health) 
with a pre-defned process model of the battery behaviour. It regulates/controls charging 
and discharging of the battery, thereby ensuring the battery system is operating safely. 
Appropriate charging and discharging of battery is essential for maximizing the lifespan 
and performance of the system. Overcharging of battery could result in physical damage 
(including explosion) while over-discharging would increase the batteries’ aging rate. 
Periodically BMS responds to EMU’s request for PCS status data. The EMS is basically a 
website hosted on a AWS (Amazon Web Services) cloud server, which allows the authorized 
personnel (using valid login accounts) to perform the following activities: (1) see both 
historical and real-time data regarding PCS and BMS; (2) shutdown/restart EMU; (3) carry 
out energy management functions such as confguring the charging/discharging limits; 
and (4) override the set-points on PCS and BMS via EMU. 
4.2. Analysis 
Due to space limitation, the analysis artefacts presented in the following are not 
intended to be exhaustive, but illustrative, to demonstrate the application of the proposed 
methodology. Additionally, technology-specifc details have also been abstracted for 
commercial sensitivity. An overview of the proposed methodology is provided in Figure 3. 
The information provided in Section 4.1 can be regarded as data gathered by Step 1 of the 
proposed methodology. Architecture diagrams like Figure 5 can be used to derive a list of 
the system components. Surely, more details gathered (if possible) in Step 1 would provide 
more useful inputs to the subsequent steps. 
Based on the data gathered in Step 1, Step 2 deduces the unacceptable accidents/losses 
and their causal hazards. Considering the properties of Li-ion batteries, the unacceptable 
losses should include fre/explosion caused by Li-ion batteries, and the ageing of Li-ion 
batteries. These losses are usually associated with some hazards shown in Table 2. Based 
on the specifcations of the system components, potential vulnerabilities may be identifed 
by utilizing relevant vulnerability databases, security testing tools, etc. For example, CVEs 
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) of EMU can be identifed via a particular network 
scanner called Nmap. 
Table 2. Some examples of the system hazard. 
ID Description of hazard 
H1 Battery ignition 
H2 Battery temperature high (beyond 60 degrees) 
H3 Battery over-charged 
H4 Battery over-discharged 
H5 Acidic/corrosive/fammable/toxic substances due to electrolyte leakage 
Step 3 identifes a list of signals that the system components may receive and output, 
considering the data gathered by Step 1. All signals shown in Figure 5, such as “Mod-
bus request” and “Measurements”, are necessary signals. As for unnecessary signals, it 
was found that EMU (by default Bluetooth-enabled) emits Bluetooth signals that are not 
required by any operations of the system; Bluetooth device could be hacked; therefore, 
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from the point of view of Security, any wireless connectivity (including Bluetooth) that is 
not being used or needed should be disabled to minimize the attack surface. 
For every identifed signal, Step 4 examines how would its receiver (system compo-
nents) behave in response to inappropriate signal. As mentioned in Section 3, a signal can 
be inappropriate in four ways; not all of them are always applicable. An excerpt of result 
of Step 4 is depicted in Figure 6, describing how PCS Controller behaves both internally 
and towards the system components which it interacts with when the input signals S1 
and S3 are not provided or incorrectly provided. As shown in Figure 5, PCS controller is 
supposed to interact with PCS inverter and EMU. Basically all behaviors of PCS Controller, 
described in Figure 6, can be hazardous. They may also imply faws in the algorithm of PCS 
Controller that should be fxed for improving the safety or security; for instance, in case of 
not receiving latest measurements, PCS Controller should somehow alert the maintenance 
personnel to check on PCS Sensors. 




How signal receiver behaves if the signal is not 
provided
How signal receiver behaves if the signal is 
incorrectly provided
internally PCS Controller remains operating with last 
configuration which may lead to inappropriate 
operation
PCS Controller would be wrongly configured, 
thereby leading to inappropriate operation
towards EMU - -
towards PCS Inverter - PCS Controller would command Inverter to 
operate with wrong mode
internally PCS Controller does not alert about the absence 
of latest measurements
-
towards EMU - -













Figure 6. Identifying how PCS Controller behaves due to inappropriate signals S1 and S3. 
For every identifed signal, Step 5 identifes the potential causes (PCs) of inappropriate 
signals. Figure 7 gives an example of PCs for inappropriate signal S1 (“Confguration 
needed”), which are derived from the template (shown in Figure 4); from the perspective 
of PCS Controller, receiving incorrect or not receiving S1 means input failure; therefore, 
according to the branch “Input Failure (IF)” of the template (depicted in Figure 4), S1 
failure is mainly caused by S1-I1, S1-I2 and S1-I3. These PCs can be further elaborated by 
applying the relevant nodes of the template; the elaboration is iterative until a reasonable 
middle ground is achieved. For instance, S1-I1 mentions component (EMU) malfunction; 
so, according to the template, all three branches for “Algorithm Failure”, “Input Failure” 
and “Damage or Disruption” may be applied to elaborate S1-I1; this results in S1-I1-A1, 
S1-I1-A2, S1-I1-I1, S1-I1-I2, S1-I1-I3, and S1-I1-D1. Likewise, S1-I1-I2 mentions component 
(transmission medium) malfunction; thus, the entire template may be applied again to 
elaborate S1-I1-I2, thereby leading to S1-I1-I2-D1. Nonetheless, not all branches or nodes of 
the template are always applicable to any system components. 
Step 6 outputs a set of S&S requirements based on STRIDE analysis and also by negat-
ing the identifed PCs. MTMT result can not only be converted into Security requirements, 
but may also be used to refne some identifed PCs; for instance, as MTMT result men-
tions the possibilities of replay attacks on particular data like Modbus messages, S1-I3 can 
therefore be refned as “PCS Controller receives replayed signal S1”. 
In the following, we discuss the 8MD illustrated in Figure 8; note that the matrices’ 
symbols are described in Table 1. 
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ID# Potential causes of inappropriate signal S1 ("Configuration needed")
S1-I1 The legitimate input provider, i.e. EMU, malfunctions;
S1-I1-A1           EMU's algorithm is tampered;
S1-I1-A2           EMU's algorithm is outdated;
S1-I1-I1           EMU's legitimate input provider (e.g. power adapter) malfunctions;
S1-I1-I2           The transmission medium (e.g. cable of power adapter) malfunctions;
S1-I1-I2-D1                      Cable of power adapter is damaged/disrupted due to mechanical force;
S1-I1-I3           EMU receives inappropriate signal from illegitimate source;
S1-I1-D1           EMU is damaged/disrupted due to overheat;
S1-I2 The transmission medium, i.e. Modbus serial adapter cable (MSAC), malfunctions;
S1-I2-A1           MSAC's algorithm is tampered;
S1-I2-A2           MSAC's algorithm is outdated;
S1-I2-D1           MSAC is damaged/disrupted due to corrosion;
S1-I2-D2           MSAC is damaged/disrupted due to electromagnetic interference;
S1-I2-I1           MSAC's legitimate input provider (i.e. EMU) malfunctions;
S1-I2-I3           MSAC receives inappropriate signal from illegitimate source;
S1-I3 PCS Controller receives inappropriate signal from illegitimate source;
Figure 7. Example of Potential Causes (PCs) derived from the template. These PCs describe why S1 
(“Confguration needed”) can be inappropriate (i.e., incorrect or not provided). 
ID# H1 H2 H3 C1 C2 C3.1 C3.2 C3.3 C4.1 C4.2 C4.3 C5 R1 R2 R3 R4
H1 Battery ignition X
H2 Battery temperature too high X
H3 Battery overcharged
C1 EMS <> <>
C2 EMU <> <> <>
C3.1 PCS Controller <> > <
C3.2 PCS Inverter X < > <>
C3.3 PCS Sensors > <
C4.1 BMS Controller <> <
C4.2 BMS Battery Pack X X X <> >
C4.3 BMS Sensors > <
C5 Router <> <>
S1 Configuration needed P R
S3 PCS measurements R P
S7 BMS measurements R P
S8 Restart EMU P R T
S9 BMS and PCS data R P T
R1 Ensure integrity of C2 X X
R2 Ensure integrity of C5 X X
R3 Ensure availability of C5's Wi-Fi X X X
R4 C2 generates correct S9 X X X
M1 Disable C5's Wi-Fi X O O X
M2 Password complexity X O
M3 Limit number of SSH login attempts X O









Figure 8. A highly simplifed version of 8-Matrix Diagram (8MD) built for the case study. 
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4.2.1. Matrices Constructed Prior to Step 7 
Matrix HH captures the cause-and-effect linkages among the identifed hazards. For in-
stance, PCS inverter failure may lead to battery overcharging which would subsequently 
cause the battery’s temperature to rise beyond the safe range; then, if thermal fuses fails, 
then thermal runaway might happen and therefore leads to battery ignition. Nonetheless, 
this matrix can also be converted into fault trees if preferred. 
Matrix CH captures which components are the direct/immediate causes of the haz-
ards. For instance, C3.2 (PCS inverter) is directly responsible for H3 (Battery overcharged 
because it is the component that realizes (or actuates) charging/discharging even though 
in reality it is EMU who inappropriately commands PCS controller (which then commands 
PCS inverter) to continue charging the battery. Additionally, C4.2 (BMS Battery Pack) is 
immediately responsible for H1, H2, and H3 simply because it is the component where 
these hazards manifest themselves. In other words, this matrix indicates which component 
should be investigated frst in case of hazard. 
Matrix CC captures all necessary interactions between the system components. It 
can be useful to point out: frstly, which components are immediately affected in case of 
component malfunction/compromised/removal; for instance, in case of C3.2 malfunc-
tion/removal, directly affected components are C3.3 and C4.2 as their inputs are provided 
by C3.2; and secondly, which components could be directly causing a component to mal-
function; for example, in case of C4.1 malfunction, immediate suspects would be C2 and 
4.2 as they provide inputs to C4.1. 
Matrix SC captures which components are the intended providers, receivers, or trans-
mission medium of the necessary signals. In case of observing a signal being inappropriate, 
we can fnd out which components are its receivers, sources, or transmission mediums, 
and thereafter conduct checks on them if necessary. Depending on the system architecture, 
there could be multiple providers, receivers, or transmission mediums for the same signal. 
Matrix RC captures which requirements might be violated in case of component mal-
function/compromised. The purpose of this matrix is identical to that of [23]. The criticality 
of a component may be determined according to the number/criticality of requirements 
that may be violated due to its malfunction. The criticality of the components/requirements 
is a major factor in the mitigation strategy. 
4.2.2. Matrices Constructed during Step 7 
Matrix RR captures the potential conficts between requirements. Ensuring confden-
tiality/availability/integrity is a common high-level security requirement, thereby giving 
rise to R1, R2, and R3. Another reason behind R3 is that the Wi-Fi of C5 is intentionally 
enabled to allow on-site maintenance engineers to remotely connect/access any device 
(including C2) within C5’s network. Note that C2 is connected to C5 via Ethernet cable. 
Initially, no confict was identifed among them until C5’s WPA2 (Wi-Fi Protected Access II) 
protocol is found hackable, and this thus implies potential violation of R2. Once successfully 
hacking C5, the adversary can perform various attacks on C5’s network such as hacking 
SSH (Secure Shell) login of C2, and intercepting/forging/tampering with S8 and S9. Such 
attacks would lead to violating several requirements including R1. Simply put, satisfying 
R3 may violate R1 and R2, if no measure has been introduced to prevent/mitigate them; so, 
we can say that R3 conficts with R1 and R2, as refected by Matrix RR in Figure 8. Matrix 
MC captures which components are involved in implementing the measures. A measure 
could be realized by a single component alone or a combination of individual components. 
For example, M4 is a particular mechanism that leverages on a combination of C2, C3.1, 
and C4.1 to detect anomalous S3 or S7; this would help C2 to produce accurate S9, thereby 
contributing to satisfying R4. Matrix MR captures which measures would violate or help 
satisfying the requirements. For instance, as aforementioned that R3 conficts with R1 and 
R2, applying M1 would of course help satisfying R1 and R2 while violating R3. 
Suppose now we want to fulfl both R2 and R3. From Matrix MR, we can see that M1 
would violate R3, and may thus consider it undesirable. As compared to M1, M2 seems 
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more attractive because it satisfes R2 while not violating R3. However, before jumping 
to conclusions that M1 should not be applied, we check: frstly, Matrix RR, to identify 
which requirements would potentially be violated; it shows that R1 and R2 are conficted 
by R3; the number/criticality of requirements should be taken into consideration; sec-
ondly, Matrix RC, to identify which components could be affected due to the conficted 
requirements; for instance, R1 violated would render C2’s integrity questionable; to foresee 
the impact of compromised C2, we could refer to Matrix MC, Matrix SC or Matrix CC; 
thirdly, Matrix MC, to identify which measures might be compromised due to component 
malfunction/compromised; for instance, C2 malfunction/compromised would render M4 
ineffective as M4 requires a functional combination of C2, C3.1 and C4.1; to foresee the 
consequence of ineffective measure (e.g., M4), we could refer to Matrix MR for its associ-
ated requirements; fourthly, Matrix SC, to identify which signals could be affected due to 
component malfunction/compromised; for instance, C2 malfunction/compromised would 
cause inappropriate S1 and S9 that subsequently affect their intended receivers, i.e., C1 
and C3.1; ffthly, Matrix CC, to identify which components would be immediately affected 
due to component malfunction/compromised; for instance, C2 malfunction/compromised 
would directly affect C1, C3.1, C4.1, and C5. 
Nevertheless, we could check on these matrices in different order, depending on which 
aspects of the system we take into consideration. After much consideration, our decision 
regarding M1 and R3 is described as follows. The decision criteria, typically including 
implementation cost and time, may vary on a case-by-case basis. In this case study, we 
consider that the advantages of applying M1 far outweigh its disadvantages. Securing 
C5 with M2 alone is not promising. M2, which imposes a longer complex password 
on C5, would only increase the time needed to crack C5’s Wi-Fi. In other words, given 
enough time and additionally through social engineering, C5’s Wi-Fi can still be hacked; 
as a result, the entire network of C5 may be compromised. In view of the current set 
of measures, we have determined to maintain M1 and nullify R3. Please note that the 
example shown in Figure 8 is a highly simplifed version of the actual 8MD of the case study 
to demonstrate the application of the proposed methodology. Besides, some measures 
may be realized by utilizing the current set of components while some may introduce 
additional/new components to the system. Any later/resultant changes in the system 
architecture, including removal or addition of component or signal, would iterate the 
analysis from Step 1. Such iteration of analysis however could be accelerated by re-using 
the previously generated artefacts including 8MD. Based on the 8MD, analysts could 
narrow down the elements which need revision; subsequent revisions would update 
the 8MD. 
5. Conclusions 
STPA is a hazard analysis technique that has been widely applied in various domains 
including aerospace and automobile. In this paper, we review a selection of existing works 
which adopt or extend STPA for addressing both Safety and Security of CPS, and note two 
major gaps as follows: (a) little or no explicit guidance on deriving Security requirements; 
and (b) lack of discussion on overseeing the correlations between the derived Safety and 
Security requirements. 
The proposed S&S analysis methodology aims to address the aforementioned gaps. 
Specifcally, we derive both safety and security requirements from a template (depicted 
in Figure 4), and subsequently integrating them with the results of STRIDE analysis. It is 
worth mentioning that the presented template is not exhaustive but could be tailored for 
specifc applications. For instance, a template tailored for an (offine) autonomous vehicle 
is probably inadequate for defning the S&S requirements for an CAV (Connected and 
Automated Vehicle); the latter, as it is online and tele-operated, it is likely to have greater 
attack surface and thus more cybersecurity concerns; to derive relevant templates with 
high level of granularity, domain/application-specifc expertise is needed. 
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To facilitate overseeing the correlations between the derived S&S requirements (e.g., 
confict resolution), we introduce an 8-Matrix Diagram (8MD); as illustrated in Figure 8, it 
consists of eight matrices that capture various correlations among fve crucial aspects of the 
analysed system. We illustrate the proposed methodology using a case study of a realistic 
and commercial safety-critical CPS, and also discuss how 8MD is utilized for addressing a 
particular confict between the derived requirements. 
Nevertheless, this paper by no means intends to suggest that STPA outperforms 
other existing techniques (e.g., FTA, FMEA and attack trees/graphs) in terms of analysing 
hazards/threats. The authors believe that all these existing techniques are useful, as in 
general they help analysts perceive/deduce potential safety/security issues of the analysed 
system from different angles with different scopes. Additionally, some techniques may be 
user-friendly to one but complex to another. There is a learning curve in mastering any of 
these techniques. 
As for future work, the authors shall explore enhancing the user-friendliness and 
comprehensiveness of the proposed S&S analysis methodology by (1) integrating aforemen-
tioned existing techniques besides STPA, (2) designing a systematic set of rules/instructions 
on applying the matrices, and (3) discussing how the S&S risks may be estimated. 
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